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one for the jury if reasonable minds could differ on whether
or not the two productions are similar.
I would reverse the judgment with directions to the trial
court to overrule the demurrer as to all counts and permit defendants to answer if they be so advised.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied May 28,
1953. Carter, J., and Spence, J ., were of the opinion that
the petition should be granted.

[h A. No. 22215.

In Bank.

Apr. 29, 1953.]

THOMSON BURTIS, Respondent. v. UNIVERSAl! PIC'l'URES COMPANY, INC. (a Corporation) et al., Appellants.
[1] Literary Property-Evidence.-In action for unauthorized use
of literary property, a judgment for plaintiff is not sustained
by evidence that he first wrote an outline synopsis designed
for development into a motion picture script, which was submitted to defendant motion picture company; that on the
basis of this synopsis plaintiff and defendant entered into
an agreement under which plaintiff was to complete an original story suitable for a motion picture and defendant was
granted an option to purchase the story for a designated sum;
that the story, on its completion, was delivered to defendant,
which did not exercise the option and which retained both
the synopsis and the story; and that defendant some years
later produced a picture based on the same basic theme, where
a comparison of the story and the motion picture shows no
similarity between them as to form and manner of expression.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Henry M. Willis, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
Action for damages for unauthorized use of literary property. Judgment for plaintiff reversed with directions.
[1] See Cal.Jur., Literary Property; Am.Jur., Literary Property and Copyright, § 66 et seq.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1] Literary Property.
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Loeb & Iweb, Herman F'. Selvin and Harry JJ. Gershon
for Appellants.
Fendler, Weber & Lerner, Harold A. Fendler, Robert W.
Lerner and Jacques Leslie for Respondent.
EDMONDS, J .-Thomson Burtis, the author of an assertedly plagiarized sereen play, was awarded damages for
the unauthorized use of his literary property. The principal
lluestion presented for decision upon the appeal from the
judgment concerns the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the verdict of the jury.
[1] In 1938, Burtis, an established professional writer, submitted an untitled story synopsis to Universal Pictures Company, Inc. 'l'he synopsis interested Universal to the extent
that it entered into a written agreement with Burtis providing
that, for $250, he would write an original story of not less
than 10,000 words "suitable for a Danielle Darrieux photoplay" to be tentatively entitled "Manhattan Masquerade."
He gave Universal an option, to be exereised within two weeks
following delivery of the story, to purchase it for $3,250.
In the event Universal did not exercise the option, it was
to obtain no right, title or interest in the story.
Subsequently, Burtis wrote a story of about 20,000 words,
which he delivered to Universal. The company did not exercise
its option but retained both the untitled synopsis and the
screen script in its files until this action was filed. A review
of the synopsis, in mimeographed form, prepared by an employee of Universal, was available to all writers and producers
on the lot.
In lieu of developing the personalities of characters in
''Manhattan Masquerade,'' Burtis, in most instances, utilized
the device of naming well known motion picture stars ''to
aid the reader in visualizing the characters'' which he had in
mind. The story may be summarized as follows :
Adolph Menjou is an impecunious bon vivant whose current economic objective is to marry Spring Byington, "the
wealthiest widow in America." He is the author of "At
Twenty-I Have Lived," a risque novel written under the
pen name of "Nanette." Andy Devine, a gardener formerly
in Menjou's employ, has stayed with him in the capacity of
valet while he awaits payment of wages now :five years past
due. Menjou 's publisher is Horatio Livermore, a hypocritical
and ruthless businessman who invents artistic excuses to
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justify the publication of sexy novels. Lionel Stander, !Jivermore 's press agent, is a frustrated writer who conceals his
sensitivity with a sardonic, jeering attitude.
Despite Menjou 's protests that he does not want to write
any more of that ''rot,'' Livermore insists upon a sequel
to Nanette's first book, telling of her girlhood experiences in
European boarding schools. To secure background material,
Livermore sends Menjou to Paris. Before his departure,
Menjou discovers that Prince Mischa Auer of Wetsalia has
moved into the Byington menage as a permanent, and unscrupulous, house guest.
In Paris, Menjou meets Gabrielle Roulet, a teacher of English
in a finishing school. Although at heart a mischievous, if naive,
flirt, at school she wears horn-rimmed spectacles and draws her
hair ''severely around her face.'' At home, with her hair
down, she is charming. Her housekeeper is Vera Gordon, a
Russian with an earthy sense of humor who delights in stuffing
guests with her cooking. In between bouts of indigestion induced by Vera's culinary efforts, Menjou subtly secures from
Gabrielle the information which he desires without disclosing
his purposes.
Menjou returns to New York and, shortly thereafter, "At
Eighteeen-I Had Also Lived" is published. It becomes an
immediate best-seller, Nanette's identity being a question
of public interest. The press clamors for information and
~Walter Winchell serves an ultimatum upon Livermore that
he will discover Nanette if her identity is not revealed exclusively to him. Menjou, Livermore and Stander are desperate. Disclosure of Menjou as Nanette, it is feared, will
ruin his plans to marry Mrs. Byington and also destroy the
market for the books. They decide to bring Gabrielle to
New York to act the role of Nanette.
Despite the instrnctions of Rene Petain, l1ivermore 's exuberant Parisian agent, that she is not to leave her eabin during
the trip, Gabrielle ventures forth and is seen by John Castle,
young career diplomat. Castle manages to become acquainted
with her by impersonating the steward serving her cabin.
In a comedy sequence, Vera and Gabrielle discover his pretense. However, they keep their mission secret.
By the time Gabrielle reaches New York, the puhlicity
eoncerning the mysterious Nanette has reached a crescendo.
Stander has caused a Boston bookseller to be arrested for
selling one of the books. When Gabrielle arrives, she and
Vera are secretly installed in a swank apartment and coached
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as to their roles. Suitable wardrobes and beauty treatments
are provided. In a coup designed for the dual purpose of
providing authenticity to the act and ridding himself of competition, Menjou employs Prince Mischa to pretend to have
been one of Nanette's European lovers.
For the first time, Gabrielle reads the books which she is
to pretend to have written. She is shocked and angered, but
Vera, reveling in the story, persuades her to continue with
the deception. Prince Mischa already has undertaken his role
with vigor, running up fantastic bills to outfit himself and
a growing host of fellow princes and blackmailing Menjou
into meeting the overhead.
Once during her tutelage for the role she is to play,
Gabrielle has slipped away from Andy Devine, now functioning as her bodyguard, to see young Castle, with whom she
is in love. She still has not disclosed her dual identity to
him.
As Nanette, Gabrielle is introduced to the press and society
with a lavish, ali-day program. She captivates the reporters,
while Vera stuffs them with her cooking. Society is pleased,
albeit somewhat shocked, by this vivacious siren with the naive
manner. Alexander W oollcott is completely captivated by
her frankness.
Disaster overtakes Gabrielle at a dinner party given by Mrs.
Byington. There she is introduced to Castle's aristocratic
parents and prospective fiancee as the notorious Nanette.
Silently, she pleads with her eyes for Castle to understand her
plight. He reacts with scorn and contempt.
Thereafter, the mad social whirl continues in an evermounting frenzy of publicity. Stander, realizing Gabrielle
loves Castle, hides his own love for her and urges even more
publicity. The Immigration Department begins an investigation of Nanette's entry into the country. Meanwhile, the
FBI has taken an interest in her reputed activities as an
espionage agent and her close association with Prince Mischa,
a known foreign spy. Pretending a reconciliation, John Castle
tricks Gabrielle into coming to Washington, where she is
subjected to interrogation by ,J. Edgar Hoover. Gabrielle
flees to the French Embassy for sanctuary.
There the story reaches its climax and conclusion as the
principals gather and the full truth of the hoax is revealed.
At Castle's request, Hoover threatens Gabrielle with deportation unless she marries an American citizen. Castle offers to
marry Gabrielle, and a happy reconciliation is effected. Mrs.
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Byington is delighted to discover that Menjou has written
the books. W oollcott broadcasts the entire story and comments
that the books have true literary quality. Prince Mischa, suddenly discovering himself again unemployed, promptly recoups his financial position by offering to marry Vera, who
will receive 50,000 francs as payment for her part in the
hoax. All ends happily in the marriages of the three couples.
On cross-examination, Burtis testified that the idea of a
book being written under an assumed name was not original
and that he had done the same thing himself many times
during his career. The idea of attributing authorship of a
risque book to a woman when, in fact, it had been written
by a man was, he said, a reverse twist upon actual occurrences
in the literary lives of French authoresses Colette and George
Sand. The climax of the story, possible deportation for moral
turpitude, Burtis testified, was suggested by the true incident of Countess Cathcart who was refused admission to this
country upon similar grounds.
According to Burtis, certain characters in his story had
been suggested to him by various previously issued motion
pictures. As he said: ''All that a professional writer can do
is take elements of recognizable characters, recognizable to
anybody, and combine them in a new form, like a new chemical
combination makes a new material, until boy meets girl becomes an original story because of the way that all the common
elements are combined.''
Almost eight years after Burtis had presented his story to
Universal, it produced and released the motion picture "She
Wrote The Book." The picture, which is a part of the evidence in the case, has been viewed by the Justices of this court.
As the picture opens, ''Always Lulu'' has become a best
seller of such magnitude and questionable repute that it is
banned in all of the important cities of the world. George
Dixon, publisher, and Jerry Marlowe, his breezy, confident
advertising manager, are worried because they know neither
who, nor where, Miss Lulu Winters, the authoress, is. The
press is demanding information. Unexpectedly, they receive
a telephone call from Lulu announcing that she is coming to
New York to pick up her royalty checks, amounting to more
than $80,000. At her insistence, they promise no publicity.
Actually, Lulu is Phyllis Fowler, wife of the Dean of Croyden College, a small and financially foundering school in Great
Falls, Indiana. She has kept her secret for fear of ruining
her husband and the college. The faculty, ignorant of the situ-
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ation, has banned" Always l1llln" and threatened to expel any
~;tudents fonnd rf'ading it, of whom there have been a number.
However, Mn;. Fowler believes that the royalty checks awaiting her must be secured to benefit the college.
Professor Jane Featherstone (played by Joan Davis), a
prissy, mid-Victorian and apparently sexless female, is about
to leave for New York to deliver a lecture to a scientific convention upon the '' F'eatherstone 'l'heory of Molecular Agglutination." Mrs. F~owler requests Jane to impersonate Lulu
long enough to pick up the royalty checks while she is in New
York. Jane is horrified by the revelation of authorship and
revolts at the suggested impersonation, but finally agrees to
the proposition for the good of the college.
On the train to New York, Jane meets Eddie Caldwell, a
studious young engineer with whom she carries on a learned
uiscussion concerning the mathematics of bridge construction.
Upon arrival in New York, she agrees to meet him for dinner
and Eddie gives her a snapshot of himself. However, neither
of them learned the other's name.
Meanwhile, Jerry has arranged a parade with police escort,
a press reception, and a round of social gatherings for Lulu
when she arrives. These grandiose arrangements suddenly
are discarded when Dixon and Jerry get their first agonized
look at the prim professor, posing as Lulu. While they are
attempting to decide how to handle this unexpected situation,
,Jane learns from Dixon's secretary of the elaborate arrangements made for Lulu's reception. In panic, she bolts from
the building, pursued by Jerry. Jane jumps into a taxicab
to effect her escape, losing her purse and all means of identification in the process. Jerry follows with motorcycle patrolmen, sirens wailing. Hearing the police, the taxi driver slams
his cab to a stop, throwing Jane to the floor and rendering
her unconscious.
When Jane awakens, she is suffering from amnesia. Jerry,
sincerely believing that she is Lulu, tries to bring back her
memory by reading ''Always Lulu'' to her. Having no reason
to believe that she is not Lulu, Jane enters into the spirit of
her supposed character with relish and soon is making advances toward Jerry.
After she has been properly outfitted, Jane is introduced
to the press as Lulu. During the interview, she announces
that there will be no sequel to her book. Dixon and Jerry
determine that, if they are to have another story to publish,
they must part Lulu from her money with rapidity. For this
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purpose, they persuade a friendly bartender, Joe (played by
Mischa Auer), to impersonate Count Boris Pototski, one of
the many lovers mentioned in ''Always Lulu.'' In the book,
Boris had been an expert at spending Lulu's money and Joe
promises to be equally adept at this pastime. Without further
ado, Joe moves in as Jane's constant, and costliest companion.
However, Joe's task soon is complicated by Horace Van Cleve,
a middle-aged tycoon and would-be playboy who begins throwing money at Jane almost faster than the imaginative Joe can
spend it. ,Jerry decides to end this problem by arousing
Mrs. Van Cleve's jealousy.
As Jane's social life becomes more and more hectic, news
of her role reaches Croyde n College by way of "Vanity"
magazine, which features a cover picture of Lulu. The shock
is profound, and the faculty decide to have nothing more to
do with her. Meanwhile, Jane has met Eddie again at the
Van Cleve shipyard and asks him to dinner. Her only recollection of him is the picture, all that had remained of her
possessions after the taxi accident, A companion informs
Eddie of Imlu 's identity and Eddie, after reading "Always
Lulu,'' reacts with disgust.
That evening, the situation reaches a climax with almost
the entire cast gathered in Jane's suite. Joe, the first to
arrive, retires diplomatically to the bedroom as Eddie enters,
kisses Jane violently, and then berates her for her supposed
deception. Just as Eddie finishes telling Jane how contemptible he thinks she is, Mrs. Van Cleve appears brandishing a
revolver, of which Eddie has the thoughtfulness to relieve her.
Van Cleve walks into the melee dangling a diamond necklace
for Jane, which he quickly transfers to his wife. ,Joe, his
dignity unruffled, is discovered reclining in the bedroom.
,Jerry bursts upon the scene and, in attempting to defend Jane
against Eddie's accusations, receives a punch on the jaw.
Soon all are gone but Joe, who proposes marriage to ,Jane.
She aceepts, but unfortunately mentions that she now has no
money left. ,Joe politely, but hastily, departs, reporting to
,Jerry that his job is completed.
But Jerry's task is far from over. If he is to get another
book for Dixon, he must help Jane recover her memory.
Because Eddie has ~>aid he met her on a train from Great Falls,
.Jerry decides to take her there. On the Croyden campus, they
accidentally walk into a faculty meeting, where Jane is greeted
with bitter accusations. She does not understand what is happening, and Jerry explains her illness to the faculty members,
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who do not relent. As Jerry and Jane are leaving the campus,
Jane happens to wander into her former classroom. Absentmindedly, she corrects a mathematical error in a problem on
the blackboard, and suddenly her memory returns.
Mrs. Fowler confesses to her husband that she is the author
of "Always Lulu." But the disclosure means little now;
Croyden College is about to close for lack of funds. Jane
decides to return to New York to ask Van Cleve to provide
money for the school. Her first approach as Professor Featherstone is a complete flop. But, with Jerry's help, she tries
again as the flamboyant Lulu. Disrupting a very formal
party at Van Cleve's estate, she literally blackmails him into
buying her off by providing money for the school. At the
height of the confusion, Eddie arrives with important blueprints for Van Cleve. In short order, he is fired, slugs Jerry,
and turns Jane over his knee and spanks her, all without
allowing anyone an opportunity to explain the situation to him.
Everything ends happily with Jane back on the Croyden
campus. Eddie follows her to Great Falls. Van Cleve's money
staves off immediate disaster. Jerry's release of the full story
to the newspapers creates a sudden influx of students anxious
to study literature under Lulu, promising continued prosperity for the school.
The jury found in favor of Burtis. The motion of the
defendants for a new trial was denied and their appeal is from
the judgment entered upon the verdict.
The defendants contend that the evidence is insufficient to
sustain the implied finding of plagiarism because there are
no substantial similarities between their production and protectible portions of Burtis' story. The determination of the
extent to which a literary work is entitled to protection is,
they say, a question of law which may be determined by the
appellate court regardless of any implied finding by the jury.
They also complain that the trial court erroneously instructed
the jury upon the elements of plagiarism, protectible property, and damages. In addition, it is contended that the award
of damages is excessive and that counsel for Burtis committed
prejudicial misconduct. For the purposes of this appeal, it is
conceded that some similarity exists between the productions
as to a portion of the basic theme. Another concession is that
the originality of Burtis' story, and the defendants' access to
it, have been adequately proved.
Burtis disputes each of the contentions of the defendants.
He argues that the questions of originality, protectibility,
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access, similarity and copying are for the trier of fact, and
may not be determined as a matter of law. A plot, or theme,
he says, is protectible. Furthermore, he claims that the evidence shows misappropriation of his major characters, characterizations, motivation, treatment, and a substantial sequence
of scenes and events.
The appellate court may determine whether the evidence
of originality, protectibility, access, similarity and copying is
sufficient to support the verdict. (Golding v. R.K.O. Pictures,
Inc., 35 Cal.2d 690, 695, 698-699 [221 P.2d 95]; Stanley v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 35 Cal.2d 653, 662-663
(221 P.2d 73, 23 A.L.R.2d 216]; Universal Pictures Co. v.
Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 357; cf. Weitzenkorn v.
Lesser, ante, p. 778 (256 P.2d 947]; Kurlan v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc., ante, p. 799 [256 P.2d 962] .)
If there is sufficient evidence to establish these elements of the
tort, the verdict of the jury upon the questions of fact raised
by the evidence will not be disturbed. However, in the final
analysis, the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law.
The defendants contend that a "theme," "idea," or "subsection of a plot'' is not protectible and that the monopoly
of common law copyright extends only to the treatment and
manner of expression. However, at the time this cause of
action arose, section 980 of the Civil Code provided that, ''The
author of any product of the mind, . . . has an exclusive
ownership therein, and in the representation or expression
thereof.'' Relying upon this former wording of the statute,
the court held, in the Golding case, that the ''product of the
writer's creative mind" (p. 695) is protectible and extended
protection to his idea, "the basic dramatic core" (p. 697)
of his play. Thus, under the earlier form of the statute, a
''theme'' or ''idea'' was protectible, although at common law
and under the 1947 amendment to the statute protection is
extended only to "the representation or expression" of a
composition. ( Cf. W eitzenkorn v. Lesser, supra.)
One of the instructions of which the defendants complain
was given in the language of the statute as it read at the time
this cause of action arose. As applied to the facts of this
case, the instruction is not erroneous.
A careful comparison of Burtis' story and the defendants'
motion picture shows no similarity between them as to form
and manner of expression. The motivation, characterizations,
and sequence of events is essentially different in each. However, the defendants concede that there is some similarity

832

BuRTIS

v.

UN'IVERSAL PICTURES

Co.,

INc.

[40 0.2d

betwt>en the productions as to a portion of the basie theme.
This consists of a risque book written under a pseudonym by
an anthOI" who, for personal reasons, does not wish to be
identified. The public, naturally, is interested in the author's
identity. A female schoolteacher is requested to impersonate
the author, and a succession of events occurs, including the
inevitable "boy meets girl" routine. The boy is disillusioned
and disgusted when he is led to believe that the girl has a
lurid past. All finally ends happily when "girl gets boy."
These similarities between parts of the basic dramatic core
of each story are the only similarities discoverable from a
comparison of the productions. Therefore, the question is
whether they are sufficient, by themselves, to sustain the implied finding of copying of a substantial portion of Burtis'
protectible property.
In holding the ''basic dramatic core'' of a literary production protectible in the Golding case, the court looked to the
entire theme of the story. It said: "Literary property in the
fruits of a writer's creative endeavor extend to the full scope
of his inventiveness. This may well include, in the case of
a stage play or moving picture scenario, the entire plot, the
unique dialogue, the fundamental emotional appeal or theme
of the story, or merely certain novel sequences or combinations
of otherwise hackneyed elements." (Pp. 694-695.) In other
words, under the statute as it formerly read, the original
combination of unoriginal ideas into a dramatic theme might
create a protectible property interest in the combination,
although the separate ideas were not themselves protectible.
As stated in the Stanley case, the isolated ideas may not be
original, ''But when all of these elements are joined to make
one ideas for a radio program, it is the combination which
is new and novel." (Pp. 663-664.)
Here, it is conceded that the combination of ideas is original. Therefore, the basic dramatic core of Burtis' story
was protectible under the former wording of the statute. But
there is no admission that each of the ideas in the combination
was original and, in fact, Burtis' testimony shows the opposite.
He states that the idea of a risque book written under a
pseudonym by an author who, for personal reasons, does not
wish to be identified, was not original. Nor is there anything
original in public interest in the identity of a notorious author.
What was original, and thus protectible, was the combination
of these and other ideas into a basic theme for a story.
Although the court will dissect a literary production to
determine what portion thereof is protectible (Golding v.

Apr.1953]

BuRTIS

v.

UNIVERSAL PICi'URES

Co.,

INc.

833

[ 4() C.2d 823; 256 P.2d 933]

R.K.O. Piet,ures, Inc., st~pra, p. 700), it will not examine the
protectible portion to discover isolated similarities as to each
segment of the whole. (Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc., supra, p. 662.) Instead, as was held in the
Golding case, upon the issue of similarity the standard of the
ordinary observer should be applied and comparison of the
protectible portions should be made without dissection and
without expert or elaborate analysis. (Pp. 699-700.) In that
ease, the basic dramatic core, the psychological situation, in
each production was similar to the other in its entirety.
The only similarities which here appear may be found only
as the result of dissection of the basic dramatic core of each
story. Given only the elements of each story which are similar, and subtracting therefrom those which are admittedly
unoriginal, there is no basic dramatic core. No framework
is created by these elements alone which requires only body
and filling to expand the central situation into a recognizable
story. There is, in fact, no central situation. From these
isolated elements, almost any basic dramatic eore could be
created and virtually any plot developed.
For the evidence to be sufficient to support a finding of
similarity, and thus of copying, the two works must present
a substantial similarity insofar as the plaintiff's property
in his work is eoncerned. (Golding v. R.K.O. Pictures, Inc.,
supr·a, p. 699; Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,
supra, p. 663 ; cf. W eitzenkorn v. Lesser, supra.) "In determining whether the similarity which exists between a copyrighted literary, dramatic or musical work and an alleged
infringing publication is due to copying, the common knowledge of the average reader, observer, spectator or listener
is the standard of judgment which must be used." (Stanley
v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., supra, p. 662.) Here,
without unnecessarily dissecting the basic dramatic core of
each work, there is no substantial similarity between them to
justify the finding of the jury, as the "average, reasonable
man,'' that there was copying.
To have anything of value, Burtis had to add to the ideas
above di~cussed certain vital ingredients which would create
a dramatic situation. These included a deliberate hoax to
be perpetrated upon the public by the male author and his
publisher acting together. A reason for the hoax was essential, and Burtifl supplied it in the form of economic necessity,
sale of the book and marriage to a wealthy widow. It was also
eRsential for his dramatic purpose that the hoax be discovered
40 C.l!d.--27
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under spectacular eireumstanees, so the deportation investigation is ineluded. 'l'hese elements, added to the others,
establish a recognizable framework upon which to build a
story.
However, none of the latter elements appear in the defendants' motion picture. No one perpetrates a deliberate hoax
upon the public; the one attempted is upon the unsuspecting
publisher. 'fhe essential ingredient is a victim of amnesia
who honestly believes that she is the author of the lurid novel
and that it aecurately depicts her past. By this device, the
motion pieture is made essentially humorous, whereas Burtis'
story is serious drama with some comedy relief. In the motion
pieture, the eentral problem is to assist the principal charaeter in reeovering her true identity; in Burtis' work it is
how to hide identity. 'fhus, in the pieture, there is no necessity
for a speetacular explosion of a myth. Here, again, is a basie
dramatie core when these elements are added to the others, but
there is no similarity between it and the framework of Burtis'
story.
Burtis also contends that five major characters in both productions are substantially the same in characterization, motivation and treatment. The very fact that Burtis failed to
develop in detail any of the characters in his story weakens
his contention considerably. Any similarities are only of the
most general nature. Gabrielle and Jane both are schoolteachers, naive, and possessed of the common trademarks of
fictionalized female teachers. But Gabrielle is a vivacious and
mischievous flirt; Jane is so strait-laced that she finds it
necessary to screen a partially undraped statuette and can
strike up an acquaintance with a strange man only by discussing mathematical formulae. John and Eddie both possess
morally eorrect ideas of eonduet and are dismayed at the
supposed identities of their respective girl friends. However,
John is the thoroughly trained, unruffled, gentle-mannered
socialite sophisticate. Eddie, on the other hand, is a roughand-tumble engineer who engages in public brawls and thinks
nothing of crushing a girl in his arms and then berating
her lack of morals or of administering a public spanking to
a woman. Livermore and Dixon are both publishers of a
notorious book, but the former is a confirmed hypocrite, the
latter solely a businessman. The press agents are vastly
different, Stander being a hard-bitten cynic who refuses to
permit even love to stand in the way of his duty while Jerry
is a sympathetic soul anxious to assist Jane in every possible
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way. Mischa Auer, of course, remains Mischa Auer, portraying· his usual role. Certainly it cannot be said that an
author may forever prevent an actor from earning his living
by the simple device of casting him as a character in an
1mpublished story.
Although it might be possible that an author could so
('.at'efnlly delineate a character as to secure a protectible
property interest in that character, generally it is held that
a character is not included within the monopoly of copyrig·ht.
( W ar·ner Bros. P·ictnr·es v. Colwnbia Broadcasting System.,
102 l<'.Snpp. 141, 147; Deteet1:ve Comics v. Bn~ns Publica.lions, lll F.2d 432, 434.) Here there has been no such careful
development of characteri;mtions. Only the barest outlines
have been drawn, leaving the remainder to the talents of the
particular actors chosen to fill the roles. "It follows that the
less developed the characters, the less they can be copyrighted;
that is the penalty an author must bear for marking them too
indistinctly." (Nichols v. Universal P•1:ct1tres Corp., 45 F.2d
119, 121, cert. denied 282 U.S. 902 [51 S.Ct. 216, 75 L.Ed.
795].)
These conclusions make it unnecessary to consider the contentions concerning the propriety of certain instrnctiom:,
the award of damages, and the conduct of counsel for Burtis.
In this case, all of the possible evidence bearing upon the
issue of similarity has been presented to the court in the
form of the productions themselves. 'fhere being no evidence
of substantial similarity between the motion picture and proteetible portions of Burtis' production, the implied finding of
<•opying of B11rtis' property has no support in the record.
1Jnder these circumstances, this eourt may direct entry of a
proper jndgment. (Code Civ. Proe., §53; ef. Pollitz v. Wickersham, 150 Cal. 238, 251 [88 P. 911] ; Schroeder v. Schweizer
L.1'.Y.O., 60 Cal. 467, 471-472 [44 Am.Rep. 611.)
'I'he judgment is reversed with direction to the sltperior
<·<nn·t to rnter a judgment for TTniversal Pietnres Companr.
I ue., \Va nrn Wilson, Osear Hrodne.r and .J o~pp}J Clen:hrm:nn
aml denying rdief to Thomson Burti,;.
Gibson, C. J., and Shenk, J., concurred.
'l'raynor, .T., and Spence, ,T., concurred in the judgment.

SCHAlJEH, J.-·-1 emwnr in the judgment and in what is
hereinafter specified as being what I understand Justice
Edmonds' opinion aetually holds; I further agree that ''A
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careful comparison of Burtis' story and the defendants' motion picture shows no similarity . . . as to form and manner of
expression." I do not agree with what is said in Justice
Edmonds' opinion in attempting to distinguish this case from
GoLding v. R.ILO. Pictures, Inc. (1950), 35 Cal.2d 690, 710712 [221 P.2d 95].
This case, it appears to me, is controlled by exactly the same
principles which should have controlled in the Golding case.
The plot (or, as Justice Edmonds denominated it, the "basic
dramatic core") used by the plaintiff and the defendants in
this case, is, as was true in the Golding case, in the public
domain. It is to the credit of both the intelligence and the
integrity of Mr. Burtis, the plaintiff here, that he testified
''All that a professional writer can do is take elements of
recognizable characters, recognizable to anybody, and combine them in a new form, like a new chemical combination
makes a new material, until boy meets girl becomes an original
story because of the way that all the common elements are
combined.'' There being nothing new or novel in the plot it is
not, as such, protectible. Hence, unless the author's combination, embellishment and treatment of the common materials of the public domain do in truth create what Burtis
likens to ''a new material'' made by ''a new chemical combination'' of the old elements, there is, at least generally
speaking, no protectible product of the mind.
'l'he basic holding here, essential to the judgment, appears
to me to be irreconcilably inconsistent with the Golding
holding. The suggestion is made that the Golding decision
was based on the "former wording of the statute" ( Civ.
Code, § 980) · and that because of the subsequent amendment
of the statute this case can be distinguished from and is not
eontrolled by the Golding case. ,Justice Edmonds here says
"Thus, under the earlier form of the statute, a 'theme' or
'idea' was protectib~e, although at common law and under
the J 947 amendment to the statute protection is extended only
to 'the representation or expression' of a composition." But
in th(~ Golding case the majority said (pp. 694-695 of 35 Cal.
2d) : "The rights asserted jn this case are not based 'il.pon
statutory copyright but stem from the so-called common-law
copyright . . . It is . . . only the product of the writer's
creative mind which is protectible . . . The question as to
whether the claimed original or novel idea has been reduced to
concrete form is an issue of law . . . Certainly, if the only
product of the writer's creative mind is not something which
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the law recognizes as protectible, that is, an idea not reduced
to concrete form . . . , no right of action for infringement
of literary property will lie . . . . "
.
For the reasons indicated above and more fully developed
in my dissent in the Golding case (pp. 710 et seq. of 35
Cal.2d) and concurring opinion in Stanley v. Col-umbia Broad(~ast-ing System, Inc. (1950), 35 Cal.2d 653, 668 et seq. [221
P.2d 73, 23 A.L.R.2d 216], I would hold that a plot as such,
being in the public domain and neither new nor novel, is not
protectible and that only the original and (except in special
circumstances not here pertinent) novel treatment of a plot, 1
which treatment (as so aptly described in the above set forth
quotation from Mr. Burtis' testimony) is the creation and
product of the author, can be protectible. This holding, it
seems to me, appears upon analysis to be the holding now
actually made by this court; it is inherent in its judgment.
I would clearly declare it to be such and expressly overrule
the Golding case.
Carter, J.-I dissent.
The majority opinion in this case goes one step farther than
that in Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, ante, p. 778 [256 P.2d 947]
and Kttrlan v. Col-umbia Broadcasting System, ante, p. 799
[256 P.2d 962]. Here, after a trial by jury, this court
holds that there was no similarity between the infringed and
infringing productions. The effect of this opinion is to deprive
an author of a cause of action for plagiarism in this state.
In the Kurian and Weitzenkorn cases, the majority states
that an author may protect his idea, etc., by an express contract. Here, plaintiff did exactly that. "In 1938, Burtis, an
established professional writer, submitted an untitled story
synopsis to Universal Pictures, Inc. The synopsis interested
Universal to the extent that it entered into a written agreement
with Burtis providing that, for $250, he would write an
original story of not less than 10,000 words 'suitable for a
Danielle Darrieux photoplay' to be tentatively entitled 'Manhattan Masquerade.' He gave Universal an option, to be
exercised within two weeks following delivery of the story,
to purchase it for $3,250. In the event Universal did not
exercise the option, it was to obtain no right, title or interest

in the story.
1
! am, of eourse, not here dealing with, or suggesting that there
eannot be, an original and novel idea, or treatment of an idea, whieh does
not involve a plot.
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"BubsPrptently, Bmtis wroiP il :-;tory nf about 20,000 words,
whi1d1 lte ddiverPd to lTniYPrsal. The company did not exercise itl-5 option but retaiMcl both the untitled synopsis and the
screen script in its files until this action was filed. A review
of the synopsis, in mimeographed form, prepared by an
employee of Universal, was available to all writers and prodm:ers on the lot in several bound volumes of story materials.''
The majority points out that ''the originality of Burtis'
story, and the defendants' access to it, have been adequately
proved.'' And that ''some similarity exists between the productions as to a portion of the basic theme.'' In order to
prevent recovery by plaintiff, this court determines for itself
that no similarity exists between the two productions. This
conclusion is reached despite the fact that the trial judge in
the first instance, as provided for by section 426 ( 3) of the
Code of Civil Procedure, first determined on demurrer that
there was similarity between the two, as it did on defendants'
motion for a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's case,
as did a jury, as did the trial court again on a motion for a
new trial, and as did three members of the District Court of
Appeal ((Cal. App.) 237 P.2d 41) in affirming the judgment.
In W eitzenkorn v. Lesser, supra, it is said that "The question of protectibility need not be considered in determining·
the sufficiency of the allegations of the first count of the complaint, based on an express contract" and that "An idea,
if valuable, may be the subject of contract. While the idea
disclosed may be common or even open to public knowledge,
yet such disclosure if protected by contract, is sufficient consideration for the promise to pay (citations).' '' Here, it is
said that '' 'fhe only similarities which here appear may be
found only as the result of dissection of the basic dramatic core
of each story. Given only the elements of each story which
are similar, and snbtracting therefrom those which are adm-ittedly unoriginal, there is no basic dramatic core. No framework is created by these elements alone which requires only
body and filling to expand the central situation into a recognizable story. There is, in fact, no central situation. From
these isolated elements, almost any basic dramatic core could
be created and virtually any plot developed.'' So far as an
t>xpress contract is concerned, there is no need for all portions
of the production to be original (see W eitzenkm·n v. Lesser,
supra) . Therefore, it is not necessary to ''subtract'' the
admittedly unoriginal elements from Burtis' story in comparing the two for the purpose of determining similarity.
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Further, there is a basic core, or central theme, to Burtis'
story. He has an author of a risque book who wishes to remain
anonymous. The sex of the author is different in the motion
picture but the book is also a risque one. There is a hoax
perpetrated on the public. In each case the hoax is developed
differently but nevertheless perpetrated for the same reasonthat the real author wishes to remain anonymous. In both
eases, a schoolteacher is the person chosen to impersonate the
author. In both cases, there is a "phony" member of the
nobility to add a comedy touch, although the theme is developed differently in the two. In both cases there is an upright
and moral young man who is horrified to find that his girl has
written such "trash." Again, the two love stories are developed differently. In both productions there is a pecuniary
necessity for money, and here, too, the idea is developed differently in the two.
This statement is found in the majority opinion : ''Although
the court will dissect a literary production to determine what
portion thereof is protectible (Golding v. R .K. 0. Pictures,
Inc., supra, p. 700, it will not dissect the protectible portion
to discover isolated similarities as to each segment of the
whole." It is admitted that the so-called protectible portion
here is the basic dramatic core of Burtis' story (held so
because of the former wording of Civ. Code § 980). In "dissecting'' it is apparent to the average observer (as has been
proved by the judicial background in this case) that the
central theme, as set forth above, is similar to that found in
defendant's motion picture. "\Vhether or not that central
theme is original in its entirety is, under the pleading and
proof in this case, not important because here, there was an
express contract and agreement by defendants to pay for
plaintiff's story if they used it. The contract provided that
plaintiff was to write a "complete original story" for which
defendants would pay if it was used by them. While the ideas
are not individually original, it is conceded that "the combination of ideas is original.'' A plot is defined as a number of
incidents which together form the action of a play or novel
(Amdur, Copyright Law and Practice, 3, 703); "A plot
is a connected series of motivated events or situations, forming
the pattern, O'utline or skeleton of the story action. It is a
statement of the problems or obstacles that confront certain
eharacters, their reactions to those problems or obstacles and
the result" (Ball, The Law of Copyright and Literary Property, § 171, p. 366; Shipman v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, 100
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F.2d 533; Roe-Lawton v. Hal E. Roach Studios, 18 F.2d 126;
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119; Harold Lloyd
Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1). (Emphasis added.)
It is true that there are differences in the minor characters
and the development of each one, but as Mr. Justice Edmonds
said in Gold~:ng v. R.K.O. Pictures, Inc., 35 Cal.2d 690, 699
[221 P .2d 95], "The basic factors of the play and the moving
picture show strong similarity in their respective plots although superficially there is considerable difference. But
S'Uch differences go to the quality of the plagiarism, and not
to its existence or nonexistence." (Emphasis added.)
The majority, after admitting that the verdict of the jury
upon questions of fact will not be disturbed if there is evidence
to support it, states that "in the final analysis, the sufficiency
of the evidence is a question of law." It is a question of law,
but to no greater extent in plagiarism cases than in any other
type of case where there has been a jury verdict. When a
verdict is attacked as being unsupported, the power of the
appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to
whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted, which will support the conclusion reached by
the jury, and when two or more inferences can be reasonably
deduced from the facts, the reviewing court is without power
to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court (Crawford v. Southern Pac. Co., 3 Cal.2d 427 [45 P.2d 183] ; Juchert
v. Cal1:fomia Water Service Co., 16 Cal.2d 500 [106 P.2d 886] ;
Richter v. Walker, 36 Cal.2d 634 [226 P.2d 593] ; Alexander
v. Angel, 37 Cal.2d 856 [236 P.2d 561]). Here, contrary to
the well settled rule, this court has made a determination, de
novo, on the question of similarity which had been, prior to
this decision, determined favorably to plaintiff three times by
the trial court, once by the jury, and once by the District Court
of Appeal.
There has always been deeided and strong opposition toward
any ehange in the jury system. It is argued that to have all
issues tried by the court, sitting without a jury, would add
greatly to the labors of the court, tend to cause inaccuracy
in and hostile criticism of its decisions of fact, and would
expose the judiciary to attempts at bribery or charges of corruption which would lower its standing in popular estimation.
In Yeaman, Study of Government (chapter XIII, 177, 178),
it is said that ''when men talk gravely of substituting the
learning and experience of the court for the good sense, practical experience and unbiased instincts of an impartial jury,
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violence to
, and injustice to the cause of
and
And while I would not let a jury
trench a hair's breadth upon the province of the court, I have
no hesitation in
that, for trying and settling disputed
of fact, through tho instrumentality of human testimony, where men and their motives are to be weighed and
and balances are to be struck between conflicting
witnesses, I had rather trust to the verdict of twelve fairminded men of average shrewdness and intelligence in a jurybox, than the judgment of any one man trained to the habits
of judicial investigation and aecustomed to measure his conclusions by the scale and standard of the law. I had rather
trust to the honest instincts of a juror, than the learning of a
judge. Nor do I believe that . . . there are more instances
of mistaken verdicts than of mistaken rulings of law. The
most we can expect from either jurors or judge, is an approximation to accuracy in the respective spheres in which they
act.''
Whatever the origin of the jury system may have been
(whether derived from Scandinavian or Roman sources) it is
well established that it was not until the reign of Edward III,
about 13i52, that trial by jury, such as we now understand it,
came into existence. From then on, however, there has persisted a strong popular conviction among English-speaking
peoples, that no person should be deprived of his life, liberty
or property except by the concurrent judgment of 12 of
his peers. As early as 1215, there was incorporated into the
Magna Charta a provision which guaranteed the people this
right: "No free man shall be taken or imprisoned, nor be
disseised of his freehold or liberties . . . nor shall we pass
upon him or condemn him, but by the lawful judgment of his
peers.''
During the Middle Ages, the jurymen were chosen because
of their knowledge of the facts and performed the duties of
the present day jury as well as those of witnesses; early in
the 15th century in England, the system changed so that the
jury made its decisions founded upon evidence supplied by
witnesses; and changes in rules of evidence, as well as the
right to challenge jurymen, together with improved methods
of impanelling the jury, led to our modern jury system.
Then, when we consider that our American law and legal
~nstit11tions had their origin in the judicial system of England,
as it had been developed over centuries of human experience
prior to the time of our colonization, it is not surprising that
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thit< heritage, so 7-ealonsly guarded by the British in bygone
generations, is looked upon today by American citizens as one
of the most precious rights secured to our forefathers. And
whereas a century and a half of development has produced
great changes in many of our political institutions, the fundamental principles of trial by jury have continued the same
in most essential respects.
The jury system, constituting as it does, an integral part
in the administration of justice, is emphatically a political
institution, for the administration of justice in a democracy,
such as ours, constitutes the basis of free government. As
Joseph H. Choate once clearly stated "The jury system as
it has existed for ages is fixed as an essential part of our
political institutions, and it is appreciated as the best and
perhaps the only means of admitting the people to a share,
and maintaining their wholesome interest in the administration of justice.''
It is therefore of greatest consequence that justice should
be dispensed, not only with the utmost purity, but in a
manner calculated to merit the confidence and satisfaction of
the public. It shmdd stand for the love of "fatir play," and
abhor-rence of injustice. In fact, the very essence of the jury
trial is its principle of fairness. The right of being tried, or
having his civil controversies tried, by his equals-his fellow
citizens-taken indiscriminately from the mass; who bear him
neither malice nor favor, but simply decide according to what
in their conscience they believe to be the truth, should instill
in every man a confidence that he will be dealt with impartially, and inspire him with the wish to mete out to others
the same measure of equity he would wish and expect to be
meted out to himself-each man in judging his neighbor
realizing that he also may be judged in turn ("Judge not,
that ye be not judged.'') Jury service places the people
themselves, or at least a representative group of them, upon
the seat of judgment; and to this extent actually places the
direction and control of society in their hands. In fact, the
"trial by jury," is the only instance of judicial power, which
the people have reserved unto themselves.
''And when twelve impartial men, chosen at random from
the neighborhood of the controversy, aided by the experience
and authority of a judge, shall have declared under the sanction of an oath, what is the truth upon disputed facts,
the verdicts they render, assuming the jury to be representative of the citizenry of the community, may be deemed to
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represent the state of public feeling and spirit, and a tolerably
correct index of the opinion entertained by society, on the
rights and obligations in issue." ("Twelve Men in a Box," by
Stanley F. Brewster, Member of the New York and District
of Columbia Bars.)
The Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States provides: ''Sec. 1. In suits at common law, where
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right
of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury
shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law."
(Proposed Sept. 25, 1789; ratified Dec. 15, 1791.)
Article I, section 7 of the California Constitution provides:
"The right of trial by jury shall he secured to all, and remain
inviolate; hut in civil actions three-fourths of the jury may
render a verdict. . . . ''
That the jury trial bas always been considered to he one
of the greatest rights of free men can be seen from the fact
that the Charter of 1681, granting to William Penn what came
to he called Pennsylvania, extended full power to make all
necessary laws (subject to royal veto) and included a "Bill
of Rights'' in which was an express provision of the right of
trial by jury. The "Frame of Government" of the Province
of Pennsylvania, confirmed by its First Provincial Council
( 1682) provided that "all trials shall be by 12 men, and as
near as may be peers or equals of the neighborhood and men
without just exception.''
'rbe case of Plymouth Colony is typical. One of the first
laws passed after the settlement declared "that all criminal
facts, and also all manner of trespasses and debts between
man and man shall be tried by the verdict of twelve honest
men to be empaneled by authority in the form of a jury
upon their oath."
It shonld also be noted that the Declaration of Independrw•.e lists as one of the "repeated injuries and usurpations"
of tht~ EnglisJ1 King, ''depriving us, in many cases, of the
beJH'fit of trial by jury."
A general constitutional provision guaranteeing inviolability of the right of trial by jury forbids any substantial
infringement of that right. What is this court doing but
infringing this constitutional right to a trial by jury when,
as in this ease, it overturns the result reached not only by a
jnry, hut by the trial court on the motion for a directed verdict and a motion for a new trial? It appears to me that
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this court is doing indirectly what it is forbidden to do directly
-that it is abrogating the right of an individual to have his
case tried by a jury of his peers. It has done essentially the
same thing in many recent cases and the list is an evergrowing one. Yet the members of this court, who join in
the majority opinion, avidly take loyalty oaths although not
required to do so. All of these oaths contain a solemn vow to
support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of California. Does not the nullification
of the constitutional provisions here involved violate these
oaths?
There can be no doubt that this court, by its decision here,
has usurped the functions of the trial court, the jury, and the
District Court of Appeal, and, in the future, such cases may
as well be brought here in the first instance, since the well
settled and established rule set forth has been abrogated.
By its decision here it also puts a premium on theft which
I had always understood was a crime in this state.
I would affirm the judgment.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied May 28,
1953. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should
be granted.

